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Abstract—Although WiFi fingerprint-based indoor localization
is attractive, its accuracy remains a primary challenge especially
in mobile environments. Existing approaches either appeal to
physical layer information or rely on extra wireless signals for
high accuracy. In this paper, we revisit the RSS fingerprint-based
localization scheme and reveal crucial observations that act as the
root causes of localization errors, yet are surprisingly overlooked
or even unseen in previous works. Specifically, we recognize
APs’ diverse discrimination for fingerprinting a specific location,
observe the RSS inconsistency caused by signal fluctuations and
human body blockages, and uncover the RSS outdated problem
on commodity smartphones. Inspired by these insights, we devise
a discrimination factor to quantify different APs’ discrimination,
incorporate robust regression to tolerate outlier measurements,
and reassemble different fingerprints to cope with outdated RSSs.
Combining these techniques in a unified solution, we propose
DorFin, a novel scheme of fingerprint generation, representa-
tion, and matching, which yields remarkable accuracy without
incurring extra cost. Extensive experiments demonstrate that
DorFin achieves mean error of 2 meters and more importantly,
bounds the 95th percentile error under 5.5 meters; these are
about 56% and 69% lower, respectively, compared with the state-
of-the-art schemes such as Horus and RADAR.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of mobile computing has spurred extensive
interests in location-based services, leading to an urgent need
for fine-grained location. The past decade has witnessed the
conceptualization and development of various wireless indoor
localization techniques, including WiFi [1], [2], RFID [3],
[4], acoustic signals [5], [6], ultrasound [7], [8], etc. Due to
the wide deployment and availability of WiFi infrastructure,
WiFi fingerprint-based indoor localization has become one of
the most attractive localization techniques [9]–[14]. Roughly
speaking, a fingerprint-based scheme consists of two stages:
site survey and fingerprint matching. During site survey (a.k.a
calibration or war-driving), received signal strengths (RSS)
from multiple WiFi access points (APs) are recorded at known
locations to construct a fingerprint database. To locate a user,
localization algorithms match his RSS measurements against
the pre-labeled records and estimate his location to be the one
with the best-fitted fingerprint.
There is generally a tradeoff between accuracy, ubiquity,
and cost in designing a pervasive indoor localization system.
Accuracy has long been the primary challenge especially in
mobile environments. Even schemes that have been reported
to have very high accuracy in some instances, e.g., [2],
[13], [15], can experience rapid performance degradation in
realistic environments, with median error consistently above
5 meters [16]. In addition, there are always unacceptably
large tail errors, e.g., 10∼20m or larger. Recent works [12],
[16] found that large errors of prior works could range
from 12 to around 40 meters. Mobility further deteriorates
the performance especially for smartphone based methods.
Efforts to gain high accuracy include to leverage physical
layer information [17] and incorporate acoustic ranging [6],
[12], among others. These methods typically either rely on
information unavailable on commodity smartphones, or resort
to unrealistic cooperation among a dense crowd of peers.
In this paper, we revisit the WiFi fingerprinting localization
framework and ask whether it is possible to achieve accurate
and robust fingerprint-based localization, especially for mobile
phones, without degrading the ubiquity or increasing the costs.
To investigate the root cause of limited localization ac-
curacy, we conduct extensive experiments and uncover the
following characteristics of WiFi fingerprint-based localiz-
ation: 1) APs have different discriminatory capabilities to
fingerprint a specific location since RSS changes are inversely
proportional to the physical distance, subject to radio signal
propagation laws. Intuitively, faraway APs may lead to large
location estimation errors while close ones can help mitigate
the location uncertainty. 2) Biased RSS measurements caused
by signal fluctuation and human body blockage may present
themselves as outliers in fingerprint matching. Human body
blockage to smartphones can remove line-of-sight and weaken
the received signal by up to 10dB, thus greatly exagger-
ating the discrepancies of fingerprints measured from the
same location. 3) RSS measurements may be outdated due
to hardware and software limitations of commodity wireless
devices. In other words, latest reported RSS values could be
duplicates of previous scans performed several seconds ago.
Considering user mobility, the outdated RSS could in fact
be measurements done at a previous location, resulting in
outdated fingerprints consisting of RSS measurements from
multiple locations. In overlooking such outdated information,
previous works directly compare the outdated fingerprints
with those collected at a single location, incurring frequent
fingerprint mismatches. The above are key reasons behind
location errors of fingerprint-based schemes, especially in
mobile environments; yet surprisingly they have not been
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Figure 2. Fingerprint Inconsistency
ID RecordTime (ms) TSF Time (us) MAC RSS SSID
18 1369749309456  264186215408  #3  -91  TNS
18 1369749309456  264182232101  #2  -74   CSI232-1
18 1369749309456  264184882125  #1  -79  NETGEAR
19 1369749310797  264187543624  #2  -74   CSI232-1
19 1369749310797  264184882125  #1  -79  NETGEAR
19 1369749310797  264187543746  #3  -90  TNS
Δt=1.33s
Δt=1.34s
17 1369749308120  264184882125  #1  -79  NETGEAR
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17 1369749308120  264184882156  #3  -90  TNS
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Figure 3. Outdated fingerprints: A glance of
scanning results from Android OS
adequately addressed in existing works.
With these observations in mind, we design DorFin (named
after Discrimination diversity, Outdated RSSs, and Fingerprint
inconsistency), a new fingerprint-based scheme for highly
accurate localization. DorFin includes three main components.
First, we quantitatively differentiate distinct AP’s discriminat-
ory ability w.r.t. a specific location. APs with stronger ability
are emphasized with more weights in fingerprint matching,
while others are de-emphasized. Second, noting fingerprint
inconsistency, we apply a robust regression technique in
fingerprint matching, in the hope of bounding the impact
of RSS outlier values and ensuring accuracy under noisy
measurements. Finally, we propose phantom fingerprints that
incorporate multiple fingerprints in the fingerprint database
to deal with the outdated RSS values. Phantom fingerprints
are assembled according to the spatial constraints of outdated
RSSs, which are derived by monitoring user mobility using
smartphones’ built-in inertial sensors. Integrating these com-
ponents, we design a uniform fingerprint similarity metric
which further takes account of common AP ratio as a factor
to mitigate errouneous matches of distant fingerprints.
To validate our design, we implement DorFin on com-
modity devices and conduct extensive experiments in mul-
tiple buildings. Experimental results demonstrate competitive
performance of DorFin to solutions based on physical layer
information or on additional ranging techniques. In addition to
the average accuracy of 2m, DorFin significantly reduces large
location errors by limiting the 95 percentile errors in 5.5m,
both outperforming the state-of-the-art schemes like Horus by
56% and 69%, respectively. Using only the most essential RSS
and requiring no extra hardware, we believe our approach takes
an important step forward to accurate location estimation on
smartphones with the prevalent WiFi infrastructure.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We uncover several crucial insights that explain the root
cause of location errors but have not been adequately
studied in existing literature.
• We are the first to tackle the outdated RSS problem and
the fingerprint inconsistency in WiFi fingerprint-based
localization. We design an effective scheme for accurate
and robust localization leveraging only the prevalent RSS,
requiring no extra information or additional hardware.
• We implement a prototype system and conduct real
world experiments in multiple buildings using commodity
devices. In addition to the remarkable performance, our
method can be conveniently integrated in existing WiFi
fingerprint-based localization systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents our preliminary measurements and basic observations.
The method design is detailed in Section III, followed with the
experiments and performance evaluation in Section IV. We
discuss the state-of-the-art of indoor localization in Section V
and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARY AND MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we review the classical RSS fingerprinting
problem and investigate fundamental characteristics of radio
fingerprints through real measurements. Our preliminary res-
ults show some crucial features, which, having been largely
overlooked in the past, shed light on how to achieve high
accuracy of fingerprint-based localization.
A. Problem Statement
The working process of a typical fingerprint-based localiza-
tion scheme consists of two stages: site survey and fingerprint
matching. During site survey, wireless fingerprints (i.e., the
set of RSS values from multiple APs) are measured and
recorded at every location of interests. A fingerprint database
(a.k.a radio map) is accordingly constructed, in which the
fingerprint-location relationships are stored. To locate a user
who sends a location query with his current RSS fingerprint,
localization algorithms retrieve the fingerprint database and
return the location of the matched fingerprint as the user’s
location estimation.
Denote a fingerprint as f = [fi, i = 1, · · · , n], where fi
is the RSS value of the AP Ai ∈ A, the set of n detectable
APs appearing in f . For two fingerprints f and f ′, denote
the RSS difference (RSD) vector as δ = [δi, i = 1, · · · , p]
where δi = |fi − f ′i | indicates the RSD of AP Ai ∈ A ∪ A′
in the two fingerprints and p = |A ∪ A′|. Since f and f ′
do not necessarily contain identical sets of APs, we set fi
(f ′i ) to -100, the default minimum RSS value, if Ai /∈ A
(A′). Let φ be the dissimilarity between f and f ′, which,
if measured by Euclidean distance, can be calculated as
φ(f ,f ′) = ‖δ‖ = √∑pi=1 δ2i . For all fingerprints stored in
the fingerprint database F , the goal of fingerprint matching is
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Figure 4. Outdated RSS phenomenon: The reported RSSs in one fingerprint might be outdated.
to find the fingerprint f∗ that achieves the highest similarity
with respect to the query fingerprint f . Formally,
f∗ = arg min
f i∈F
φ(f ,f i). (1)
Then the user’s location is estimated as the corresponding loc-
ation L(f∗) of f∗. Assumimg the true location of f is L(f),
the location estimation error is given by ε = ‖L(f)−L(f∗)‖.
B. Observations
Observation 1 (Discrimination Diversity) APs have diverse
discrimination capability to fingerprint a specific location,
subject to inherent constraints of radio signal propagation.
Discrimination capability is referred to as the ability of one AP
to distinguish a specific location when using its RSS observa-
tions as fingerprints. Ideally, subject to the propagation law of
wireless signals, RSS decays logarithmically with propagation
distance d. More formally, RSS ∝ − log(d), indicating that
∆RSS
∆d ∝ − 1d , where ∆RSS denotes the RSS change and
∆d is the corresponding distance change. In other words, an
identical ∆RSS can imply a smaller distance change ∆d at
closer locations, or a larger ∆d at faraway positions. As shown
in Figure 1, RSS variance of 1dB in value corresponds to
vastly different changes in physical distance, depending on
the specific d. Hence, faraway APs may cause large errors in
location estimation, while close ones can conversely mitigate
the errors. In a nutshell, distance changes indicated by RSS
variances depend on the transmitter-receiver distance, leading
to diverse discrimination capability across different locations.
Observation 2 (Fingerprint Inconsistency) The majority of
APs hold similar RSSs for fingerprints from the same/close
locations while a small fraction may exhibit large differences
due to environmental dynamics and human body blockages.
Location errors originate from unmatched fingerprints meas-
ured from the same/close locations. Our investigation on these
fingerprints indicate that a majority of APs exhibit relatively
stable RSSs even when these fingerprints are not matched.
That is to say, the fingerprint dissimilarity (under certain
metric such as Euclidean distance) is primarily produced by
the drastically fluctuating RSSs of a small portion of APs,
which is, however, obviously not caused by location changes,
but probably stems from ambient dynamics and human body
blocking effects [18], [19] especially in mobile environments.
As shown in Figure 2, signal strengths perceived by smart-
phones decrease significantly when the human body blocks
the direct path of signal propagation, compared to when the
user is facing the AP. These weakened RSS observations
of blocked APs tend to deviate from the normal profiles,
resulting in abnormal RSSs when compared with fingerprints
measured during the training phase. Taking Figure 2 as an
example, the normal RSS profile absent of body blockage
is measured to be f = [−40,−65,−50]. When a user is
present and faces left, the right AP is blocked, resulting in
a biased fingerprint f left = [−40,−65,−65] (for simplicity,
we assume RSSs of unblocked APs remain unchanged). When
facing right, the line of sight of the left AP is blocked and
its RSS is correspondingly weakened, creating a fingerprint
f right = [−52,−65,−50]. Then comparing f left and f right
with the normal f produces inconsistent RSD distributions
δleft = [0, 0, 15] and δright = [12, 0, 0], both generating abnor-
mally larger fingerprint dissimilarity and ultimately leading to
greater location uncertainty. Such inconsistency, however, has
largely been overlooked in existing work but is ever-present
especially for mobile users.
Observation 3 (Outdated Fingerprints) The measured RSS
might be outdated due to incomplete scanning results, caused
by software and hardware restrictions.
Commodity smartphones acquire WLAN information in a
passive scanning mode by listening to periodic beacons from
surrounding APs on all working channels. In this mode, the
time a client stays on a channel is 100ms by default, which
is specified by the 802.11 standard [20] and is equal to the
default beacon interval. Consequently, the latency incurred
in capturing the AP information for 2.4GHz WiFi is about
1,100ms since there are 11 available channels. In practice,
it takes about 1∼1.5 seconds for mainstream Android OS to
complete a scan with commodity smartphones. Due to beacon
conflicts and channel collisions, the beacon interval of 100ms
cannot be always guaranteed, potentially resulting in some
missed APs during a scan. However, to maintain quality of
service, these missed APs can still appear in the scanning
results by duplicating information from last several scans a
few seconds ago.
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As shown in Figure 4, a significant portion of APs ex-
perience high outdated rates, ranging from 2% to 25%. In
particular, about 60% of the outdated RSSs bear an outdated
delay of 1.4s, while around 20% and 15% has a delay of 2.7s
and 4s, respectively. Translated into fingerprints, Figure 4c
indicates that over 80% of fingerprints contain outdated RSSs,
and for about 20% the maximum delay time exceeds 4s.
If a user is stationary, such outdated phenomenon has little
impact on location fingerprinting since outdated RSSs are also
measured from the same position. In mobile environments,
however, users may have moved several meters away between
consecutive scans, resulting in fingerprints comprised by RSS
values that are actually observed at multiple locations, which
we called outdated fingerprints. Previous works treat these out-
dated fingerprints as normal ones and compare them directly
to those stored in the fingerprint DB, which are all collected at
single locations. Obviously, matching fingerprints mixed from
multiple locations to those from single positions may result in
frequent fingerprint mismatches or even localization failures.
In conclusion, serious outdated RSS measurements exist in
WiFi-based location fingerprinting, and also contribute to
location estimation error especially in a mobile environment.
In this study, we reconsider the RSS fingerprinting scheme
based on these surprisingly overlooked observations. Specific-
ally, we design DorFin, an accurate, robust, and practical
indoor localization method which 1) quantitatively differen-
tiates individual APs according to their location discrimina-
tion capability, 2) applies robust regression on inconsistent
fingerprints, and 3) recombines phantom fingerprints to handle
outdated RSS values in mobile environments. The following
section details our design.
III. DESIGN METHODOLOGY
As illustrated in Figure 5, the proposed solution includes a
discriminatory policy, a phantom fingerprint assembling mod-
ule, a robust regression procedure, and a normal fingerprint
matching scheme.
A. Discriminatory Policy
Given that APs have diverse discrimination capability to
fingerprint a specific location, it is inappropriate, and also
unnecessary, to match two fingerprints with all APs equally in-
volved. More accurate location estimations can be achieved by
relying on the more discriminative APs, and limiting or even
eliminating the influence of those fluctuating and distant ones.
Toward this goal, we attempt to seek a discrimination metric
that complies with physical constraints of signal propagation
and simultaneously stays robust to RSS fluctuations.
To quantitatively differentiate each AP for a specific loc-
ation, we define a discrimination factor by estimating the
physical distance between the AP and the mobile client using
the following Log-Distance Path Loss (LDPL) model [21]:
Pd = Pd0 − 10γ log(
d
d0
), (2)
where Pd0 denotes the received power at a distance d0
(which usually takes the value of one meter), γ is the path
loss exponent, and Pd is the RSS in decibel measured at a
distance of d (in meters). Deriving the distance to AP Ai
from the LDPL model, we calculate its discrimination factor
in fingerprint fu to location Lu as follows:
ρui =
1
dui
= 10
fu,i−Pd0
10γ , (3)
where dui is the estimated physical distance between Ai and
Lu. The rationale of using the reciprocal of physical distance
lies in that it is consistent with the derivative of the LDPL
equation, which indicates the RSS change ∆RSS ∝ − 1d .
While the exponential ρui effectively discriminates different
APs, it may also induce unnecessary matching errors in case
of fluctuating RSSs. Consider one of the APs in a fingerprint
that fluctuates to a very large value (e.g., -45dBm). In this
case, the effects of other representative APs, which could
hold considerable RSSs (e.g., up to -60dBm) and are thus
discriminative, may become negligible since they can only
get inappreciable factors three or four times smaller than
the fluctuating AP. Hence to cope with noisy RSSs, we
additionally incorporate a sigmoid function to retain the effects
of most discriminative APs. Mathematically, ρui is adjusted as
follows:
ρui =

10
fu,i−Pd0
10γ if fu,i ≤ f0
1
a
(
1 + e
−2
(
fu,i+100
10 −c
))−1
otherwise
(4)
where all constant parameters f0, a watershed RSS value, a
and c can be determined by general empirical values and meas-
urements. Afterwards, the discrimination factor is normalized
5such that
∑nu
k=1 ρ
u
k = 1. The normalized ρ
u
i then serves as
a differential weight which will be attached to the RSD of
Ai between fu and another fingerprint when computing their
dissimilarity, as detailed in Section III-D.
B. Phantom Fingerprints
As mentioned above, RSS of a specific AP reported in a
query fingerprint may be outdated. If a user is stationary, this
has little effect on fingerprint matching. In mobile environ-
ments, however, the outdated data may have been measured
several seconds ago when the user was at another location.
Subsequently, comparing fingerprint mixed with measure-
ments from multiple locations with samples from one location
can lead to false fingerprint matches.
Intuitively, a query fingerprint consisting of RSS features
of different locations should be matched with fingerprints
recombined by measurements from multiple locations, which,
however, are not directly available in the fingerprint database.
In this sense, one needs to assemble special fingerprints,
i.e., combinations of fingerprints from multiple locations, for
matching, as shown in Figure 6. These newly constructed
fingerprints do not yet exist in the fingerprint database, and
will be referred to as phantom fingerprints.
For a fingerprint f = [fi, i = 1, · · · , n], denote the
encountered timestamp of each AP Ai in f by ti. Recall
Figure 3, the scanning delay is typically longer than 1 second
by our measurements while the differences of all APs’ detected
time in one fingerprint are usually small (indicated by the Time
Synchronization Function1 (TSF) timestamp). Hence, if the
time difference between two APs in one fingerprint exceeds
a certain length, e.g., 0.5s, then the earlier one is definitely
outdated. In particular, for AP Ak, the outdated duration ∆tk
is computed by ∆tk = max
i=1,··· ,n
ti − tk.
As illustrated in Figure 6, assume that fk is actually the
measurement of Ak at a previous location, called bequeathal
location (BL), where a user was present ∆tk seconds ago.
Further assume that the distance and direction from the BL
to the user’s current location is `k and θk, respectively (we
will describe how to compute `k and θk shortly). Then when
comparing f with a candidate location, say, Lz , instead of
directly computing the dissimilarity between f and fz , a
sample fingerprint of Lz , we match it against the phantom
fingerprints f z assembled from fz and fBL(z), fingerprint
from the BL. Concretely, the RSS value fk in f is replaced
by that of the same AP in fBL(z). In case of multiple outdated
RSSs, all of them are replaced according to their individual
BLs, finally resulting in a precise phantom fingerprint f z .
The distance offset ` and direction θ can be estimated
by dead reckoning method using smartphone built-in inertial
sensors like accelerometer, gyroscope, and compass [10], [11],
[13], [22]. Specifically, we adopt the method proposed in
[23], which counts steps as accurately as up to 98%. The
footsteps could then be converted to physical displacement
by multiplying with the user’s step length, which can be
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing Synchronization Function.
automatically tracked [13]. The direction, on the other hand,
is estimated using gyroscope and compass as [13]. In the
following, we demonstrate that although dead-reckoning may
not be adequate for localization, it is sufficient for our purpose
of estimating ` and θ.
Due to noisy sensors and arbitrary human behavior, ` and
θ cannot be 100% accurately computed. To cope with the
erroneous estimations, we introduce an error range for each of
them, denoted as ∆` and ∆θ, respectively, and demonstrate
that the procedure of choosing BLs can tolerate these errors
gracefully. Mathematically, as shown in Figure 7, potential
BLs need to satisfy the condition that their distances and dir-
ections to the candidate location are bounded in [`−∆`, `+∆`]
and [θ−∆θ, θ+∆θ], respectively. The size of the shaded area
is S = ∆θ
(
(` + ∆`)2 − (` − ∆`)2)) = 4∆θ`∆`. Assuming
a location sample density of 2m×2m and ∆` ≤ 2 meters, the
minimal size S0 to cover two sample locations should be at
least 4∆` m2. Thus, if ∆` ≤ 2 meters and ∆θ < 1/`, we
have S < S0, which means the shaded area covers at most
one sample location, i.e., there is only one candidate BL. In
practice, the maximal value of the missing delay ∆t is less
than 5s (APs not seen for more than 5s would no longer be
reported until being detected again next time). Thus, assuming
a normal walking speed of 1.2 m/s, the distance offset can
be at most 6 meters, resulting in a minimum value of 1/`
of 16 . In other words, even though the distance and direction
estimations are erroneous, we could identify a suspicious area
and, with high probability, there is only one possible BL in the
area, as long as the errors are in certain ranges (∆` ≤ 2 meters
and ∆θ < 16 ). In case of multiple BLs (which is rare based
on our measurements), the one closest to the center of the
suspicious area (the shaded area shown in Figure 7) is selected.
Phantom fingerprints are then constructed by fingerprints from
the candidate location and those from the BLs.
According to specific location sampling density, not all
outdated RSS values need to be updated. Only RSSs with
distance offsets ` exceeding half of the unit length of sampling
grids should be replaced. If ` is less than half of the sampling
distance (including being equal to 0 which means static user),
fingerprints are merely treated in the traditional way.
C. Robust Fingerprinting
As we have observed, RSSs of one pair of fingerprints
may contain outliers because of impaired measurements due
to human body blockage. Since this is the primary cause of
biased RSSs in mobile environments, only RSSs over a small
portion of APs (that are blocked) may present outliers while
most APs would remain consistent. Thus in this section, we
propose to apply robust regression method on the inconsistent
fingerprints, in the hope of bounding the influence of outlying
measurements.
There are a large body of robust regression techniques,
including M -estimator, S-estimator, L-estimator, etc [24].
Among them, we choose the most widely adopted Least
Median of Squares (LMS) [25] estimator due to its simplicity,
effectiveness, and high breakdown point (0.5).
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Figure 8. Experiment buildings.
Given a query fingerprint fs = [fs,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p] and a
sample fingerprint f t = [ft,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p], we adopt a simple
linear regression model as follows:
yi = θ1xi + θ2 + ei, i = 1, · · · , p, (5)
where the response variables y are given by fs, while ex-
planatory variables x = f t. e = [e1, · · · , ep] indicates the
error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with
zero mean and an unknown standard deviation σ. As the
AP number p is usually small, applying robust regression on
insufficient observations does not always produce convincing
statistical results. To obtain sufficient data for regression, we
propose to compare the query fingerprint against all sample
fingerprints corresponding to a candidate location, instead of
a single averaged fingerprint. Specifically, for the candidate
location L = L(f t) with sample fingerprints FL = {fLk , k =
1, · · · ,m}, we simultaneously match fs to all records in
FL. In doing so, we acquire mp observations, which can
achieve the scale of hundreds since there are generally at least
dozens of sample fingerprints for one location in the fingerprint
database, and thus are sufficient for statistical regression like
LMS estimator. In this case, the explanatory variables x
becomes x = [fL1 , · · · ,fLm]T1×mp and correspondingly y is
expanded as y = [fs, · · · ,fs]T1×mp. The regression model is
thus rewritten as
yk,i = θ1xk,i + θ2 + ek,i, (6)
where i = 1, · · · , p, k = 1, · · · ,m, and xk,i and yk,i indicate
the value of fi in fLk and fs, respectively. Applying LMS
to the data [xy] yields θˆ = [θˆ1, θˆ2] where the estimates θˆi
denote the regression coefficients. Multiplying x with these
θˆi, we obtain the estimated values of yi as
yˆk,i = θˆ1xk,i + θˆ2. (7)
The LMS estimator is given by minimizing the median of
squares of residuals as follows:
min
θˆ
med
i,k
(yk,i − yˆk,i)2. (8)
To determine whether a value yk,i is an outlier among all
elements in y, we compare the residual rk,i = yk,i−yˆk,i to the
scale estimate σ∗ defined by [24]. Then each yk,i is adjusted
to y˜k,i as follows:
y˜k,i =
{
yk,i if |rk,i/σ∗| ≤ 2.5
yˆk,i otherwise
(9)
The boundary of 2.5 is an empirical value that has been
suggested by preliminary experience in the literature [24].
Accordingly, the RSS values of the query fingerprint fs are
regulated as f˜s,i = 1m
∑
k y˜k,i and the RSDs δst between fs
and f t are thus tuned as δ˜st,i = |f˜s,i − ft,i|.
D. Localization
Integrating all of the above components in a unified solution,
we define a new metric as follows for uniform fingerprint
dissimilarity judgment.
h(fs,f t) =
( pst∑
i=1
(ρsti · δ˜st,i)2
) 1
2
, (10)
where pst = |As∪At| is the total number of distinctive APs in
fs and f t, and ρ
st
i = max{ρsi , ρti} denotes the discrimination
capability of AP Ai for matching fs and f t. Note that the
RSD δ˜st,i could also be given by other suitable metrics such
as a probability estimation. Realizing that fingerprints from
closer locations share more common APs (or equivalently,
fingerprints with very few common APs is unlikely to be from
adjacent or same locations), the ultimate form of dissimilarity
between two fingerprints fs and f t is expanded as follows:
φ(fs,f t) = h(fs,f t) ·
pst
qst
, (11)
where qst = |As∩At| denotes the number of common APs in
fs and f t. With the above dissimilarity metric, the dissimilar-
ity of two fingerprints with fewer common discriminative APs
will be amplified. In case of no common APs (qst = 0), the
dissimilarity will go to infinity, which eradicates the mismatch
of two completely irrelevant fingerprints.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
A. Experimental Methodology
We prototype DorFin on Google Nexus S and Nexus 4
phones which both run the mainstream Android OSs. We
conduct the experiments in an office building and a classroom
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Figure 12. Effect of sample density
building on our campus, as shown in Figure 8a and Figure 8b,
respectively. We manually sample areas of interests in both
buildings and obtain a total of 83 sample locations in the
classroom building and 90 locations in the office building.
To construct the fingerprint database, we collect around 60
sample records at each location (which typically takes about
1 minute) by putting the phone on a portable desk. To obtain
training data free of human body effects, no human is present
around the desk when the mobile phone is collecting data. A
high sampling density of 1m×1m is used in site survey for
extensive evaluation. Sparser data are then derived from these
densely surveyed samples.
We consider both static and mobile cases for testing. For
stationary cases, we collect query data by letting users record
measurements at each location with their smartphones held in
hand. For a mobile user, the smartphone measures wireless
signals while the user is walking at a constant speed along a
designated path with predefined start and end points. Note that
the individual walking speed varies from user to user and from
trace to trace. To obtain the ground truth locations of records
along the moving trace, we compute user’s walking speed by
dividing the path length to the total time, and accordingly
interpolate between the start and end points to obtain the
location corresponding to each measurement based on their
timestamps. In total, we collect static queries from around
200 locations, and gather over 20 mobile traces reported from
different pathways, covering major areas of both buildings.
A moving average filter is employed on the raw data to deal
with noise. Location error between the ground truth and the
estimated location (measured in Euclidean distance) is adopted
for evaluation. In particular, we focus on the mean and 95th
percentile localization errors. To compare the performance to
popular approaches in the literature, we employ a deterministic
scheme RADAR [1] and a probabilistic scheme Horus [2],
two well-known methods of fingerprint-based localization. We
choose RADAR and Horus for the purpose of confirming the
performance improvements of DorFin on pure RSS fingerprint-
based schemes. To provide fair comparison, identical training
and testing data are fed to Horus, RADAR, as well as our
proposed approach.
B. Performance Evaluation
1) Overall performance: Figure 9 illustrates the localiza-
tion error distributions seen by DorFin, Horus, and RADAR
in different buildings and scenarios. DorFin achieves mean
accuracy of around 1.5m and 2.6m in office and classroom
buildings respectively, consistently and substantially outper-
forming Horus and RADAR. Besides the promising average
accuracy, DorFin significantly reduces the maximum localiza-
tion error. In both buildings, DorFin bounds the 95th percentile
errors to only about 3.7m and 6.7m respectively, while Horus
and RADAR both generate location estimation errors larger
than 15 meters under identical settings. Integrating all results
in both buildings, DorFin provides mean and 95th percentile
errors of 2.0m and 5.5m, respectively. For comparison, the
mean and 95th percentile errors of Horus are 4.4m and 17.9m
while those of RADAR are 4.8m and 18m.
To examine the performance in mobile scenarios, we test
the proposed approach on the mobile traces and report the
integrated results. Examining across all mobile traces, we
observe that the average walking speed is 1.0m/s, while
the maximum and minimum speeds are 1.5m/s and 0.6m/s
respectively, all within regular range of human walking speed.
As illustrated in Figure 9c, despite slight drop in accuracy
8compared to the static cases, DorFin maintains graceful per-
formance in mobile cases, far superior to Horus and RADAR.
Specifically, the average and 95th errors are about 3.0 meters
and 8.5 meters, respectively. In comparison with RADAR and
Horus, DorFin decreases both errors by nearly 50%. Even
though the performance in mobile cases is not as good as
static cases, the achieved accuracy remains comparable and
promising. In addition, other complementary techniques such
as path matching [26] can be integrated to further improve the
accuracy for continuous localization.
Impact of sample density. In the following, we further
demonstrate that the suprior performance of DorFin is at-
tributed to the proposed approach instead of dense samples.
As mentioned above, we sample the areas of interests with
a density of 1m×1m, which is relatively high for practical
operations. To examine the performance with sparser sample
locations, we perform DorFin with training data of different
sample densities (sample density is adjusted by sifting parts
of the samples according to their locations). As shown in
Figure 12, DorFin preserves excellent accuracy even with
sample densities of 2m×2m and 3m×3m. Specifically, with
density of 2m×2m, the mean and 95th percentile errors are
still limited at 2.5m and 7.0m respectively, both better than
those of Horus and RADAR with density of 1m×1m.
In conclusion, DorFin achieves remarkable performance in
both stationary and mobile cases, with reasonable sample dens-
ities. To understand how each module of DorFin contributes
to the integral accuracy, we next perform an analysis across
different modules.
2) Effect of Individual Modules: To provide a clear ana-
lysis, we separately employ each module of DorFin, i.e., the
discrimination factor (DF) module, the robust regression (RR)
module, the common AP constraints (CA) module, and the
phantom fingerprint (PF) module on the most basic nearest
neighbor method (denoted as Basic) described in Section II-A
and evaluate the individual performance.
Effect of DF. We evaluate the impact of DF by using a
set of empirical parameters to calculate the discrimination
factor. Specifically, the path loss exponent is set to a typical
value of 3 in indoor environments. The sigmoid function
parameters a and c accordingly adopts the values of 4 and
4.3, respectively. As shown in Figure 10, DF limits the 95th
percentile estimation error by about 40%, while the average
error is 1.5m lower than the Basic scheme, which has mean
and 95th percentile errors of 5m and 17.5m. By placing more
weight on more discriminatory APs and limiting those of
the others, DF achieves the improvement by ensuring the
similarity between fingerprints of close locations. This feature
is also illustrated in Figure 13b, which depicts the confusion
matrix of fingerprint dissimilarity after employing the DF
module (the confusion matrix of Basic scheme is shown in
Figure 13a). In addition, results from two buildings indicate
that discrimination factors with uniform parameter settings can
generate satisfactory results in different scenarios.
Effect of RR. As shown in Figure 10, by employing
RR over the Basic scheme, an average accuracy of 2.2m
is achieved, with the corresponding 95th percentile accuracy
of only 6m. Evidently, the advantages of RR are the most
significant among all modules by reducing the mean and
95th percentile errors by about 56% and 65% compared with
the Basic scheme, respectively. Figure 13d further depicts
the corresponding dissimilarity matrix. Such results on RR
confirm our observation that fingerprint inconsistency counts
as a major cause of localization errors of fingerprint-based
methods especially for smartphones.
Effect of CA. Figure 10 also demonstrates that the CA
module is simple yet surprisingly effective. Incorporating
the CA module with Basic scheme, the average and 95th
percentile localization errors are reduced by about 50% and
60%, turning into 2.5m and 6.8, respectively. Figure 13c shows
the confusion matrix after weighing the fingerprint similarity
by the common AP ratio. Dissimilarity of fingerprints from
faraway locations is largely enlarged by the common AP
ratio, while that of fingerprints from close locations is hardly
affected (since close locations share more common APs).
Effect of PF. To examine the effectiveness of phantom
fingerprints in dealing with outdated RSS measurements, we
compare the performance of the Basic method on mobile
data with and without constructing phantom fingerprints. As
depicted in Figure 11, the average and 95th percentile errors
decrease from 3.9m and 10.4m to 2.4m and 6.9m respectively
when the sample fingerprints are appropriately replaced with
phantom fingerprints. With these results, it is of interests
to examine to what extent the measured RSSs and further
the entire fingerprints are outdated. As we observed, over
11% of RSS measurements are outdated in our experiment
data. Furthermore, almost every fingerprint undergoes outdated
RSSs. In particular, there always exist large outdated distances
ranging from 2m to 6m in most fingerprints. The improve-
ments gained by using PF validate quite convincingly our
observation that the outdated RSS values can lead to location
estimation errors in mobile environments.
Building on these components, DorFin produces promising
accuracy levels even in mobile environments that are competit-
ive with that achieved by leveraging physical layer information
[14], [17] or introducing extra ranging techniques [12], [27]
(both with mean accuracy of about 1m∼3m). Requiring no
hardware modification, DorFin can enhance existing WiFi
positioning systems.
V. RELATED WORKS
In the literature of indoor localization, many techniques
have been proposed in the past two decades. The state-of-the-
art generally falls into two categories: fingerprint-based and
ranging-based.
Fingerprint-based techniques. A large body of indoor loc-
alization approaches adopts fingerprint matching as the basic
scheme for location estimation. Researchers have explored di-
verse signatures including WiFi [2], RFID [3], FM radio [26],
acoustic [5], magnetism [28], etc. Among various signatures
used, WiFi based scheme has been the most attractive.
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Figure 13. Confusion matrix of similarity between query fingerprints and training fingerprints from 90 locations
Smartphones with various built-in sensors have been lever-
aged in fingerprint-based localization to reduce or eliminate
site survey efforts. Examples include LiFS [9], unloc [11],
Zee [13], Walkie-Markie [10], etc. To provide better accur-
acy, sophisticated probability models and advanced machine
learning techniques have been employed [29], [30]. The study
[16] validates a broad range of approaches in a realistic
environments and reports that median errors of prior work are
consistently greater than 5 meters and, counter-intuitively, that
simpler algorithms frequently outperform more sophisticated
ones. Realizing that large errors always exist due to possibly
faraway locations with similar WiFi signatures, authors in
[12], [27] attempt to incorporate acoustic ranging in WiFi
fingerprinting to limit the large tail errors. Although significant
improvements are achieved, these approaches either rely on
ranging among a dense crowd of users or require calibrating
additional information. To completely bypass the instability
of RSS, physical layer information, e.g., Channel State In-
formation (CSI), is introduced and achieves an accuracy of
∼1m [17], but at the cost of ubiquity degradation (since
CSI is unavailable on most commodity smartphones). To
reduce computational complexity, different criteria for AP’s
discriminatory ability such as InfoGain [31] and MaxMean
[29] have been proposed to choose a subset of APs. However,
they are only used for AP selection, instead of attaching to
each AP for fingerprint matching.
Ranging-based techniques. These schemes calculate loca-
tions based on geometrical models rather than search for best-
fitted signatures from pre-labeled reference database. The pre-
valent LDPL model, for instance, builds up a semi-statistical
function between RSS values and RF propagation distances
[15], [32]. These approaches trade measurement efforts for
the cost of decreasing localization accuracy. EZ [32] employs
a modeling method assuming no knowledge of physical layout
or AP locations, and reports median error of 7 meters. Apart
from RSS-based ranging, CSI is recently used to obtain for
highly accurate distance and angle estimation [14]. Acoustic
ranging is also employed for fine-grained indoor localization,
such as Centour [27], Guoguo [6], etc.
Different from previous works that introduce additional
information or extra signal sources for high accuracy, we
identify the root causes of location errors in WiFi fingerprint-
based localization for mobile devices, which have been largely
overlooked in the literature. In addition, the proposed scheme
achieves high accuracy with merely the prevalent RSS, thus is
more amenable for practical applications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While WiFi fingerprint-based localization acts as the dom-
inant scheme in indoor localization, the accuracy challenge re-
mains a primary concern. In this paper, we identify several cru-
cial causes of localization errors in fingerprint-based schemes.
These observations then lead us to the design of a new
WiFi fingerprinting scheme which successfully reduces the
mean and 95th percentile location errors to 2 meters and 5.5
meters, without degrading ubiquity nor increasing the costs.
Our approach marks a significant progress in RSS fingerprint-
based indoor localization, especially for smartphones, and
sheds lights on practical deployment in the real world.
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